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Abstract
Since the 2007/08 food price crisis there has been a proliferation of multi-stakeholder processes (MSPs) devoted to
bringing diverse perspectives together to inform and improve food security policy. While much of the literature high-
lights the positive contributions to be gained from an opening-up of traditionally state-led processes, there is a strong
critique emerging to show that, in many instances, MSPs have de-politicizing effects. In this paper, we scrutinize MSPs
in relation to de-politicization. We argue that re-building sustainable and just food systems requires alternative visions
that can best be made visible through politicized policy processes. Focusing on three key conditions of politicization, we
examine the UN Committee on World Food Security as a MSP where we see a process of politicization playing out
through the endorsement of the ‘most-affected’ principle, which is in turn being actively contested by traditionally
powerful actors. We conclude that there is a need to implement and reinforce mechanisms that deliberately politicize
participation in MSPs, notably by clearly distinguishing between states and other stakeholders, as well as between
categories of non-state actors.
Keywords Civil society . Committee on world food security . Depoliticisation . Multi-stakeholder processes . Participation .
Politicization
1 Introduction
Reflecting on the landscape of contemporary food security it
can be concluded that efforts to ensure stable access to ade-
quate and appropriate food for all have not succeeded. Some
have gone so far as to label the longer term status of world
malnutrition and hunger, and the related effects of various
attempts to overcome these problems, the ‘graveyard of aspi-
rations’ (Shaw 2007). Millennium Development Goal 1,
which aimed to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, was
not met. Progress towards achieving Sustainable
Development Goal 2, to end hunger, achieve food security
and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture,
is far from optimistic.1 Data from 2016 suggests that the
number of chronically undernourished people in the world
increased to 815 million, up from 777 million in 2015
(FAO 2017). That same year, 21 countries experienced high
or moderately high domestic prices for one or more staple
cereal food commodities (UN 2017, 4). Aid allocated to ag-
riculture from member countries of the Development
Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) remains at 7 %,
where it was in the late 1990s.
Food security is a dynamic concept, developed on the basis
of contested knowledge and changing contexts. From a gov-
ernance perspective, food security represents a policy problem
1 The UN’s own reporting on progress towards achieving this goal shows that,
despite the need for increased investment in food security and agriculture,
indicator 2.a.1 of the SDGs, the global agriculture orientation index – defined
as the agriculture share of Government Expenditures, divided by the agricul-
ture share of GDP – fell from 0.38 in 2001 to 0.24 in 2013 and to 0.21 in 2015
(UN 2017, 4).
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for which there is no neutral diagnosis or solution: a so-called
‘wicked’ problem that transgresses traditional policy bound-
aries and calls for policy-making processes that reflect, orient,
and include diverse experiences, knowledge and values (Rittel
and Webber 1974; Termeer et al. 2015). In response, innova-
tivemodes of governance have been introduced to address this
complexity, including multi-stakeholder processes (MSPs)
(Breeman et al. 2015; Warner 2006). Since the 2007/08 food
price crisis there has been a proliferation of MSPs devoted to
bringing diverse perspectives together to inform and improve
food security policy (Aubert et al. 2016). Much of the litera-
ture on MSPs highlights the positive contributions to be
gained from an opening-up of traditionally state-led processes
(Fischer 2000; Reed 2008; Reed 2009; Warner 2007). Yet, in
there is also a convincing critique emerging to show that, in
many instances, MSPs have de-politicizing effects (Kuchler
2017; McKeon 2017; Swyngedouw 2005; Westberg and
Waldenström 2016), suggesting that ‘public participation has
become no more than a strategy of de-politicization’
(Tsouvalis and Waterton 2011, 3).
In this paper, we provide a critical reflection on the
(de)politicizing capacity of MSPs while also contributing
empirically-informed insights into what happens when a pol-
icy space is politicized. In what follows we introduce the lit-
erature on MSPs followed by the theory of de-politicization.
Here we pay particular attention to the critique thatMSPs are a
tool for de-politicization. We then identify three conditions,
which are central to politicizing MSPs: common rules; a di-
versity of views; and, the right for everyone to speak. These
three conditions guide our analysis of the most prominent
food security policy space at the global level: the UN
Committee on World Food Security (CFS). In line with the
theory, we explore how the CFS has, since its 2009 reform,
implemented conditions that enabled social movement actors
representing the most affected to politicize the policy-making
process. This is followed by a review of two key challenges
that have emerged in response to the politicization of the CFS:
a direct challenge to the ‘most-affected’ principle, and efforts
by hegemonic actors to reduce political dynamics in negotia-
tion processes through a discourse of objectivity. We conclude
that while the CFS offers an emerging example of politicized
participation, the politicization of the CFS could also lead to
its demise. However, a just food system requires the emer-
gence and confrontation of alternative visions that can only
take place in politicized policy processes and as such, we
argue the politicization of the CFS should be defended.
This paper is informed by long-term participant observa-
tion in a range of CFS activities (i.e., Plenary sessions and
policy working groups) from October 2010 to February
2018, enabling us to cover the years immediately following
the reform and the changes that have occurred since then. This
paper also draws on a series of key-informant semi-structured
interviews (N = 75, including follow-up interviews)
conducted in English, Spanish and French between October
2016 and April 2018. Five of these participants preferred to
submit written answers to open-ended questions. Informants
include representatives of all different categories of CFS ac-
tors, including government representatives, CFS participants
and CFS observers, selected on the basis of the key roles they
play in the CFS. Interviews were transcribed and translated
into English by the authors. Given the need to protect ano-
nymity, we reference all interviewees by a relevant but non-
identifying label and an interview number. Observations and
interviews were triangulated with document analysis (e.g.
CFS reports and policy outcomes, High-Level Panel of
Expert (HLPE) reports and e-consultations, and Civil
Society Mechanism documents). Key documents and inter-
views were first inductively coded. From there, a set of ques-
tions emerged and the documents were re-coded deductively
and analyzed using Atlas.ti, a qualitative software analysis
program.
2 Multi-stakeholder processes (MSPs)
and the (de)politicization of global food
security governance
MSPs are ‘fundamentally about participatory decision-
making and information sharing’ where ‘[k]ey stakeholders
should be represented and decide what issues to focus on
and what actions to take’ (FAO 2016). The concept of ‘stake-
holders’ emerged in the 1930s to counter-balance the growing
importance of ‘shareholders’ and related concerns around the
responsibility of corporations to the public at large (Clarke and
Stewart 1998; Lindborg 2013). The term came to be defined
as ‘any group or individual that can affect or is affected by the
achievement of a corporation’s purpose’ (Freeman 1984, 46).
Today this includes civil society, the private sector, and even
governments (FAO 2016). While form and function of MSPs
vary widely, they all recognise stakeholder interests are di-
verse, stakes are high, and opportunities exist to impact policy
(Brouwer et al. 2013).
A common criterion for identifying stakeholders in MSPs
builds on the ‘all-affected’ principle (Kuchler 2017, 195). This
principle implies that ‘only those who are affected by a deci-
sion should be entitled to have a say in it’ (Marchetti 2012,
31). When it comes to food security governance, this becomes
challenging as everyone is affected by the organization of food
systems. The universalist approach of the all-affected princi-
ple can lead to stakeholders facing different opportunities to
participate (Boström and Hallström 2010, 2013; Kuchler
2017). This is because the organization of multi-stakeholder
processes is an exercise in power; one that often plays out
invisibly (Boström and Hallström 2013, 106). A number of
authors point to the negative implications of the categorization
of stakeholders when it comes to MSPs. More specifically,
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Kuchler (2017), focusing on the Clean Development
Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, found that informal sorting
of actors into categories of stakeholders kept civil society ac-
tors outside inner circles, and that the absence of a clear
definition of stakeholder served to destabilize the
distribution of participation opportunities. Echoing these
findings, Rancière (1998) has argued that often efforts made
at expanding participation fail to adequately include margin-
alized voices, prioritizing instead actors who show ‘self-disci-
pline’. As such, many efforts at enhanced participation move
towards ‘multi-stakeholderism’, effectively upholding narra-
tives of ‘participation’ and ‘consensus’ in ways that ‘neutral-
ize political differences’ (McKeon 2017, 385).
In this paper, we focus on growing critiques that MSPs are
increasingly organized in ways that have de-politicizing ef-
fects (Clarke 2011; Fawcett and Marsh 2014; Mouffe 2005;
Swyngedouw 2011). Concerns around processes of de-
politicization have been raised in social science circles, and
with relation to food more specifically (Duncan 2016;
Moragues-Faus 2017), as part of a critique of globalization
and neoliberalism and the maintenance of elite power.
Swyngedouw (2005), for instance, has argued that the re-
articulation of the state-civil society relationship serves to re-
define and reposition the meaning of citizenship and, in turn,
the nature of democracy itself. He warns that governance be-
yond the state can lead to encroaching of market forces, which
come to set the ‘rules of the game’. Along similar lines,
Lövbrand et al. (2009, 74–75) call such arrangements ‘neolib-
eral solutions in disguise’ noting that they can enhance prob-
lems of ‘transparency, accountability and environmental
harm’ (see also Benner et al. 2004; Börzel and Risse 2005).
These de-politicizing tendencies across MSPs are not to be
equated with a lack of resistance or active political engage-
ment. Indeed, ‘depoliticisation does not represent the direct
removal of politics from the social and economic spheres’
(Burnham 2001, 136). Rather, de-politicization means that
through MSPs, complex and normative policy processes are
minimized, or structured to avoid or conceal the relations of
power and conflictual dimensions inherent in them (Mouffe
1995, 262–63).
Conceptually, de-politicization encompasses a wide range
of meanings (for summaries of the conceptual development
see see Flinders andWood 2014; Foster et al. 2014; Hay 2014;
Wood and Flinders 2015). However, two broad yet overlap-
ping conceptual camps can be identified from the literature:
one which takes a narrow definition of de-politicization, and
one which takes a more expansive conceptualization (Foster
et al. 2014, 227). The narrow definitions see de-politicization
primarily as a tool, mostly of governments. This approach
considers de-politicization as a set of activities that seek to
limit or remove the political domain from the public sphere.
Examples include having technical teams define political ob-
jectives (e.g. indicators and targets of the Sustainable
Development Goals). It also includes activities that replace
the communicative rationality of the political domain with
another rationality. For example, scientific rationality is often
adopted by technocrats who resist disagreement by character-
izing it as ignorance or ideological.
The expansive definitions of de-politicization look at the
broader processes that may limit the availability of spaces
where the political can play out; where political agency can
occur. This includes the implementation of processes that seek
to replace disagreement and a lack of consensus with consen-
sus among so-called disciplined stakeholders (i.e., those will-
ing to play the game) who are invested in avoiding being
labelled as ‘extremists’ (Swyngedouw 2009; Walters 2004).
Those who apply these definitions are centrally concerned
with the relationship between processes of de-politicization
and politicization (Foster et al. 2014, 227). In this paper we
apply an expansive definition of de-politicization as a process.
In terms of assessing the politicization of the CFS, we draw
from Rancière (1998, x–xii) who perceives political delibera-
tion – the antidote to de-politicization – to be founded on
disagreement. In this context disagreement is not meant to
denote general misunderstandings but refers instead tomaking
visible unequal relations of power within consensus-driven
policy spaces. That is, disagreement must be over the very
nature of the situation itself: about the assumed arrangement
of things (Rancière 1998). This points to disagreement being
based on different, often competing, worldviews, one of
which will be hegemonic and thus upheld by traditional elites.
Given this, it is not simply disagreement that is a key condition
for politicizing, but also ensuring that there is space for dis-
agreements which highlight competing experiences and un-
derstandings of the problemwhile simultaneously recognizing
the relations of power associated with each worldview.
Following the theory, disagreements of this nature are un-
avoidable and even necessary since they are a representation
of the varied global society (Mouffe 2005). Only by creating
spaces where these fundamental disagreements can be articu-
lated can we start to find shared meanings and ultimately
design global policies in which a broader range of the global
population can benefit (Clark et al. 1996).
Towards this end, Rancière (1998) argues that to re-
politicize policy spaces, actors need to: a) agree to a common
set of rules of engagement; b) ensure a diversity of views are
represented; and, c) ensure everyone, including ‘extremists’,
have the right to speak. Recognizing that these conditions are
overlapping and interconnected, in what follows we use them
to guide our analysis of processes of politicization across the
Committee on World Food Security (CFS). In the next sec-
tion, we look at the common set of rules that instituted the CFS
as an MSP following the 2009 CFS reform. We then turn to
the second condition and discuss the mechanisms that enable a
diversity of views to be represented through categorizing the
participation of different non-state actors within the CFS. Our
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exploration into the third condition looks at how the ‘extrem-
ists’, who in the case of the CFS would be the social move-
ments representing the most affected, have self-organized
through the Civil Society Mechanism (CSM).
2.1 Reforming the CFS: Establishing a set of common
rules
In October 2009, 101 member-country delegates met at the
headquarters of the United Nation’s (UN) Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) to approve reforms to the
UN’s Committee on World Food Security (CFS) so that the
Committee could ‘fully play its vital role in the area of food
security and nutrition, including international coordination’
(FAO 2013, 207). Through the reform the CFS declared itself
to be a ‘multi-stakeholder platform that enables all viewpoints
to be considered’ (CFS 2011). The reform, along with the CFS
Rules of Procedure, represent the set of common rules of
engagement that actors agree to when they enter the CFS
policy space. In what follows, we explain the rationale and
structure of the reformed CFS, with particular consideration to
the common rules that inform two of the key pillars of the
reform: inclusivity through participation and evidence-based
policy outcomes.
The reformed document of the CFS outlines clear rules for
participation organized around three categories: Members,
Participants and Observers. Membership is open to all mem-
ber states of the United Nations. Observers are other entities
and individuals (such as academics) who can request to be
invited to observe entire sessions or specific agenda items.
Participants are non-state actors, specifically civil society ac-
tors, the private sector, philanthropic foundations, financial
institutions, international research bodies, and UN institutions.
Member states are to ‘take into consideration the views of all
participants and stakeholders to the fullest extent possible in
order to foster ownership and full participation’ (CFS 2009,
para. 18).
The CFS includes a number of structures where members
and participants interact (Fig. 1). The Bureau, made up of only
member states, is the executive arm of the CFS and is support-
ed by the Advisory Group, made up of representatives from
the participant categories. Intersessional work is organized
around Technical Task Teams and Open-Ended Working
Groups made up of member states and participants. The
Plenary is the central body for decision-taking, debate, coor-
dination, lesson-learning and convergence by all stakeholders
at a global level on food security issues. Plenary sessions are
held annually and attended by members, participants and ob-
servers. The CFS has a permanent Secretariat made up of staff
from three Rome-basedUN agencies: FAO, IFAD andWFP. It
works to support the Plenary, the Bureau and Advisory Group
and the High-Level Panel of Experts (HLPE). The Secretariat
is currently hosted at FAO in Rome Fig. 1.
In terms of decision-making, the CFS has formal rules but
also makes use of non-formalized procedures. In practice,
when developing policy outcomes, the CFS aims to achieve
consensus amongst all members and participants. When con-
sensus is not possible amongst these actors, consensus is
sought from member states. In the formal CFS rules and pro-
cedures, states maintain the right to vote and voting could be
used if consensus is not found. At the time of the reform, one
of the arguments put forward by supporters of the CFS, nota-
bly the FAO, the Latin America government regional group-
ing and civil society organizations (CSOs), was the commit-
ment to the principle of ‘one country, one vote’ (Duncan 2015,
70). With regard to politicization, the fact that the 2009 CFS
reform maintained accountability with states runs counter the
neoliberal tendency to reduce the role of states – the so-called
hollowing-out of the public sphere (Flinders and Wood 2014,
137). Proponents of the CFS argued that one-country, one vote
served to even out geo-political power imbalances, which
would only be reinforced through for example, G8- or G20-
led initiatives that were competing with the CFS for influence
at the time. Because of the commitment to one country, one
vote, weaker states can play an important role and have had
important influence in shaping policy outcomes (Duncan
2015, 216). This has been further supported by the presence
of participants, particularly civil society actors in the negotia-
tions, enabling states and participants to create alliances. As a
result, some traditionally weaker countries have been able to
push forward or support issues that go against the status quo
(Duncan 2015, 216).
Addressing politically contentious issues is fundamental to
identifying appropriate solutions for rebuilding food systems
(i.e. access to land and natural resources, right to water,
women’s rights, food sovereignty and access to local or terri-
torial markets). Within the unique participatory space of the
CFS, the commitment to achieve consensus raises interesting
tensions when it comes to theories of de-politicization.
Following these theories, consensus-based processes have
been actively critiqued for eliminating the voices of those
Fig. 1 Structure of the Committee on World Food Security. Source:
Duncan 2016
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who do not follow the status quo, and for masking apathy
(Mouffe 1993, 2005; Swyngedouw 2009; Walters 2004).
Related to this, a central strategy of de-politicization is to
make use of consensus processes to avoid the discussion of
contentious issues: that is to limit disagreement. As such, in
many governance processes, contentious, conflictual and dif-
ficult issues are set aside in favour of issues on which actors
can reach consensus (Coglianese 1999). However, as we elab-
orate below, in the CFS the commitment to finding consensus
among states and autonomous participant groups has had the
opposite effect and the inclusion of participants across the
work-streams of the CFS has established clear pathways for
the introduction of contentious issues onto the CFS agenda
(Duncan 2016).
To summarise the first condition for politicizing participa-
tion, within the reformed CFS there has been agreement
around common rules, and importantly, these make space for
the next two conditions for politicization in that they set out
criteria for the inclusion of a diversity of perspectives. The
rules of engagement at the CFS challenge the idea that
consensus-based decision making is necessarily depoliticizing
by ensuring active engagement of a diversity of participants
but also by placing ultimate decision-making power in the
hands of states (in case there is no consensus). Further, the
CFS reform upholds the principle of one-country one-vote,
which gives traditionally weaker states a stronger voice and
supports alliances that might normally be overlooked. At the
same time, these rules reinforce the key role of states, making
them accountable to address food insecurity and implement
the right to food, which is at the heart of the CFS mandate.
2.2 Participants with intervention right: Ensuring
a diversity of views are represented
As noted above, the CFS has declared itself to be a ‘multi-
stakeholder platform that enables all viewpoints to be consid-
ered’ (CFS 2011). One of the most significant elements of the
reform was the allocation of participation rights to non-state
actors. By way of reform, and through the inclusion of partic-
ipants, the CFS agreed to ‘seek to achieve a balance between
inclusiveness and effectiveness’ (CFS 2009, 7).
Rather than fall prey to an ambiguous categorization of
stakeholders, the CFS reform structure seeks out a diversity
of participants, while explicitly prioritizing those most affect-
ed (discussed in detail in the next section). This has been
backed up by formal opportunities for participants to shape
policy processes and outcomes. The formalization of such
high-level participation is unprecedented within the UN sys-
tem and food governance fora beyond the UN system. The
official designation of ‘participants’ allows these actors to
‘take part in the work of the Committee with the right to
intervene in Plenary and breakout discussions to contribute
to preparation of meeting documents and agendas, submit
and present documents and formal proposals’ (CFS 2009,
para. 12). This move was significant. As one civil society
actor explained:
the change of our status from observers to participant
was a unique change. (…) I think we have really utilized
that space at the beginning and also could create some of
the good outcomes based on that since we have also this
equal footing thing with the governments on our opin-
ions (Interview 34).
To facilitate participation in the work of the CFS, civil society
actors and the private sector both created their own autono-
mous and independent mechanisms. These are the only two
categories of participants to have developed such mecha-
nisms. For UN Agencies, philanthropic foundations and re-
search institutes, specific organizations have been identified as
participants, for example the Gates Foundation and the global
agricultural innovation network CGIAR.
For civil society, there is the autonomous International
Food Security and Nutrition Civil Society Mechanism
(CSM). Actors who participate in the CSM have organized
themselves around seventeen sub-regions and eleven constit-
uencies: smallholder farmers, pastoralists, fisherfolk, indige-
nous peoples, agricultural and foodworkers, landless, women,
youth, consumers, urban food insecure and NGOs. Within the
governing body of the CSM, the Coordination Committee,
quotas are used to ensure balance between constituencies,
sub-regions and gender (Claeys and Duncan 2018a).
Members of the Coordination Committee are elected by way
of autonomous processes. While recognizing International
NGOs as one of its constituencies, the CSM makes a clear
distinction between NGOs and social movements and priori-
tizes social movements’ voices (this distinction is elaborated
upon below). The CSM is coordinated by a Secretariat based
in Rome.
Like the CSM, the private sector established a mechanism
to facilitate participation of private enterprises across the agri-
food value chain in the work of the CFS.2 The Private Sector
Mechanism (PSM) is led by the International Agri-Food
Network (IAFN) and is open to all those involved in address-
ing agriculture, food security and nutrition from a business
point of view – including farmers, input providers, coopera-
tives, processors, small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs)
and food companies (PSM 2017). It is important to note that at
the time of the reform (2009), the CFS was not garnering a lot
of interested from the private sector. As a result, the PSM has
been much slower in developing than the CSM. It has how-
ever grown in size since the reform and is now very active in
2 It is important to acknowledge that the CSM and PSM are spaces wherein
struggles over politics and politicization are also at play. For a review of the
internal political dynamics of the CSM see Claeys and Duncan (2018a).
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policy processes. In 2010, in the first post-CFS session, the
only participant from the private sector representative was
Croplife International (CFS 2010). In 2017, the PSM included
representatives from 58 private companies (CFS 2017, para.
1), including Bayer Crop Science, Cargill Europe, Ethanol
Europe, Monsanto, Nestlé and Syngenta. Unlike the CSM
which receives institutional funding, the PSM offers three
types of memberships, linked to a fee structure: supporting
members (€12,000); contributors (€2500); and non-paying
members. Like the CSM, the PSM organizes around thematic
working groups following the CFS’s work streams.
These two mechanisms are fundamental to facilitating the
engagement of diverse voices into the policy process. As one
state representative noted:
The added value [of the CFS] is the unique nature
of this Committee. This is really the challenge but
also the advantage of the Committee. That you have
much more difficult discussions, of course, together
with the stakeholders. It’s much more difficult to
discuss it, especially because the two big mecha-
nisms, CSM and PSM, have very different views
on specific topics, but at the same time, it’s also a
big advantage because the product and also the out-
comes in general of the Committee has much more
link to the reality, so to say (Interview 57).
In the CFS, policy outcomes are initially informed by reports
requested to the High-Level Panel of Experts (HLPE). The
HLPE is the science-policy interface of the CFS. It is made
up of a Steering Committing of internationally recognised
experts in food security and nutrition-related fields as well as
ad hoc project teams comprised of experts working on a
project-specific basis. The result is a ‘consortium of heteroge-
neous knowledge and experiences not limited to the usual
fields of formal research’ (Colombo and Onorati 2013, 71).
The HLPE is tasked with providing ‘scientific and
knowledge-based analysis and advice on specific policy-
relevant issues, utilizing high quality research, data and tech-
nical studies’ and identifying ‘emerging issues’ and helping
‘members prioritize future actions and attentions on key focal
areas’ (CFS 2009). The ability of the HLPE to include non-
published sources in its reports represents an important step
towards broadening the scope of evidence and knowledge that
informs food security and nutrition policy. As the Rules and
Procedures of the HLPE state:
Non-published sources, reporting of field projects, or
other non peer-reviewed sources are accepted as rele-
vant information sources, as far as their content is acces-
sible to the HLPE and their quality is reviewed by the
project team before incorporation in the HLPE report
(HLPE 2010, 25).
At the same time, this almost inevitably leads to the collec-
tion of data that is contradictory, or even conflictual. Yet, the
HLPE is not meant to smooth over, select sides or seek com-
promise, rather its job is to synthesize. As the first chairman of
the HLPE,M.S. Swaminathan, stated ‘[o]ne of the key roles of
the reports is to help members and participants in CFS to
understand why they disagree’ (HLPE 2017b, 2). This com-
mitment to not only accepting disagreement, but supporting
enhanced understanding of this disagreement, is central to
politicizing a policy-making process. Towards this end, the
HLPE serves a political function insofar as it expands the
scope of knowledge and expertise beyond traditional catego-
ries, challenging the de-politicizing tendencies often associat-
ed with discourses of evidence-based decision making.
Indeed, the selection of what evidence should inform policy
is not a neutral process and research has shown that decision-
makers often hide the political nature of decision-making be-
hind claims of objectivity (Duncan 2016).
This section has shown how the CFS reform makes space
for a diversity of views to not only be represented, but also
heard. Agreeing to work towards consensus on contentious
issues in a context of expanded formal interventional rights
to clearly defined categories of stakeholders is a key condition
for politicizing an MSP. The expansion of this diversity of
views and forms of knowledge beyond policy negotiations
into the scientific body of the CFS, the HLPE, works to further
politicize the policy process.
2.3 Everyone has the right to speak: A focus on those
most affected
As noted above, a common criterion for identifying stakeholders
in MSPs builds on the ‘all-affected’ principle (Kuchler 2017,
195), meaning that all those potentially affected by a decision
should be entitled to have a say in it. In the case of the CFS,
rather than the all-affected principle, the reform process ad-
vanced what we could call a ‘most-affected’ principle, giving
priority voice in the policy-making process to those most affect-
ed by hunger and food insecurity. As written in the reform
document, the composition of the CFS will ‘ensure that the
voices of all relevant stakeholders – particularly those most
affected by food insecurity - are heard’ (CFS 2009, para. 7
emphasis added). In this way, rather than trying to level the
so-called playing field, the CFS set out to account explicitly
for different experiences and power relations between and
across participant categories. Particularly relevant towards this
end is the list of categories of people to receive additional atten-
tion. The CFS reform document states that the Civil Society
Mechanism will ‘also serve inter-sessional global, regional and
national actions in which organizations of those sectors of the
population most affected by food insecurity, would be accorded
priority representation’ (CFS 2009, 16).
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The added value of prioritizing the voices of those most
affected by food insecurity in policy-making is well recognized
by certain member states. As one state representative noted:
The experience of the most affected, I think, from food
insecurity and malnutrition because from the small-
holders and the producers of food and it’s very important
to hear their perspective. Because in the vision of CFS
we have the words ‘the most affected by food insecurity’
and they are the voice of these most affected. This is the
most important thing they bring to CFS because some-
times we could lose the central point of what we are
doing (Interview 56).
This point of view is echoed by another state representative
who commented:
It’s not only governments negotiating it. It’s really peo-
ple who are most affected by hunger and malnutrition,
and also by companies directly, who are engaged in the
Plenary, and that, of course, is a very good momentum
for everything that comes out of the Committee. It gives
more value to the product (Interview 57).
The reform principle of prioritizing the voices of those most
affected has been anchored in the governance structure of the
CFS, and explicitly translated into specific CFS processes,
although it could still be strengthened. At the heart of these
processes is the agreement that the CFS would include a va-
riety of different civil society constituencies – e.g., small-
holder farmers, fishers, Indigenous Peoples, pastoralists, agri-
cultural workers, NGOs, etc. – (Claeys and Duncan 2018a),
and seek to achieve gender and geographic balance in civil
society representation (CFS 2009, para. 11). To facilitate the
participation of civil society organizations representing the
most affected, the CSM has secured specific institutional re-
sources enabling civil society representatives to travel to
Rome, and access the translation and interpretation services
they need to speak on their own behalf. Most importantly, the
CSM has internally organized in ways that give leadership
roles to social movement representatives (Claeys and
Duncan 2018a) (see below). In addition, the CSMwas granted
more seats on the Advisory Group to the CFS Bureau than
other participants: The CSM has four seats, while the other
participant categories only have one seat each.3 This decision
was justified not only by the argument that civil society actors
represent those most affected by food insecurity, but also in
recognition of the diversity of actors across civil society.
Finally, the CFS commitment to prioritizing the voices of
those most affected is expressed through a number of infor-
mal, but widely used, practices such as: the allocation of
speaking time to CSM participating organizations in Plenary,
the choice of keynote speakers from the CSM, and the selec-
tion and training of Technical Task Team coordinators coming
from the CSM.
One key factor that distinguishes the CFS from most other
MSPs should be highlighted here. It is that civil society actors
actively politicize the CFS because they have organized
amongst themselves through the CSM in highly political
ways. Reflecting back on the issue of categorization, civil
society actors have implemented categories of participation
that explicitly prioritize the voices of social movements
vis-à-vis those of NGOs. CSM policy working groups, for
example, are all led by one or more social movement repre-
sentative(s), supported by a technical facilitator coming from
an allied NGO. Social movement actors (such as La Via
Campesina, or the World Forum of Fish Harvesters & Fish
Workers) bring in demands, experiences and perspectives that
provoke disagreement within the CFS and in turn, force the
Committee to move beyond status quo. The politicization of
participation in the CFS thus goes beyond the fact that partic-
ipants are able to autonomously organize. It relates to the fact
that the CSM space is occupied by social movement leaders
(Claeys and Duncan 2018b). This shows that while rules and
mechanisms are key to supporting politicization, the political
agency of actors also plays a fundamental role.
Post-reform, the active organization and participation of the
CSM in the CFS, as well as its strong presence on the
Advisory Group, helped the CSM establish a balance of pow-
er that was favorable to civil society actors, and social move-
ments in particular. As one CSM actor involved since the 2009
reform explained:
With regards to the voices of the most vulnerable, this is
also a crucial thing that we have achieved. We were able
to make a collective voice and to make our voice more
stronger than before as individual organization. That
was also a positive impact (Interview 34).
However, as we discuss below, all of these practices are
questioned or targeted by some CFS members or participants,
forcing the CSM to constantly fight to preserve its ‘space’ and
the CFS as a whole.
To summarise the third condition for politicizing participa-
tion, the CFS has given priority voice to representatives of the
organizations representing those most affected by hunger and
food insecurity through what we called the ‘most-affected
principle’. By recognizing the right of the CSM to autono-
mously self-organize, the CFS has secured the possibility for
3 The biannual composition of the Advisory Group for 2016–17 was: FAO (1
seat), WFP (1 seat), IFAD (1 seat), Special Rapporteur on the right to food (1
seat), UNHigh-Level Task Force on theGlobal Food and Nutrition Security (1
seat), UN Standing Committee on Nutrition (1 seat), World Bank (1 seat),
Civil Society Mechanism (4 seats), Private Sector Mechanism (1 seat),
CGIAR (1 seat), Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (1 seat) as well as two
Ad hoc seats for WHO (1 seat) and World Farmers Organization (1 seat).
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everyone, including ‘extremists’, to have the right to speak. In
the case of the CFS, these extremists are social movements
representing food producers and other civil society actors
defending the right to food and food sovereignty. Following
the theory, for a process to be political, those at the extremes
need to be included. This is in opposition to many MSPs,
which conform to an anti-political condition that encourages
people to participate in ways that demonstrate a high degree of
self-discipline (i.e., working towards consensus, making ‘rel-
evant’ interventions). Those actors who show this self-
discipline are often rewarded by being invited back, or invited
to participate in related processes. In the case of the CFS, the
autonomous nature of the CSM helps to ensure that more
extreme voices from civil society are present and heard at
the CFS.
3 Challenges to the re-politicization of food
security governance
We have argued above that politicizing food security gover-
nance is fundamental to just and sustainable food futures. We
have also outlined, in line with the theory, how the CFS has
implemented conditions that enable its politicization, notably
through the participation of social movement actors
representing the most affected. However, we note that across
the literature there is a paucity of empirical assessment as to
what happens once a space is politicized. Our research shows
that politicization of the CFS has been met with strong resis-
tance by those more invested in the maintenance of the status
quo. In what follows we show how across the work of the
CFS, there are multiple, and worrying examples of actors
seeking to undermine or de-politicize the Committee. In the
face of a politicizing CFS, there have been deliberate efforts
by traditionally powerful actors to ‘reform the reform’ such as:
delegations like the United States or Russia, trying to block
topics from being discussed (for example agroecology (see
below) and human rights respectively); Canada and other G7
countries challenging to normative basis of the CFSwhile also
trying to limit the CFS to a niche role rather than as a global
convergence role; and, reducing the policy making role of the
CFS by promoting an exchange of best practices over policy
outcomes (CSM 2017, 5–6). In what follows we focus on two
examples that emerge clearly from our data: efforts to under-
mine the most-affected principle; and attempts to reduce the
possibility of disagreements in policy negotiations on conten-
tious issues.
3.1 Challenging the most-affected principle
In recent years, the reform commitment to ensuring that the
voices of those most affected by food insecurity are heard has
been put under strong pressure, with implications for politics
at the CFS. One of the direct causes of this shift has been the
rapid development of the Private Sector Mechanism (PSM).
Using its growing influence, the PSM has sought to obtain
changes in the participation structure of the CFS in ways that
threaten the prioritization of civil society voices (i.e. the most
affected) within the CFS. Most notably, at CFS 43 (2016), the
PSM sought parity with the CSM in terms of the number of
seats on the Advisory Group, arguing that it should have
‘equal voice’ at the table (Bester et al. 2017). These efforts
were supported by countries like the United States and
Australia.
In the same year, theWorld Farmers’Organization4 (WFO)
also entered the scene, bringing some 40 representatives to
CFS 43 (Schramm 2017). The WFO is an international asso-
ciation of farmers which represents ‘nano, small, medium and
large-scale farmers’ and advocates ‘on behalf of farmers in
global policy forums’ in an effort to ‘create the conditions
for the adoption of policies aimed to improve the economic
environment and livelihood of producers, their families, and
rural communities’ (WFO 2017). Although the WFO was
granted observer status and not participant status (like the
CSM and PSM), the CFS Chair repeatedly granted the WFO
speaking time in the CFS 43 Plenary, a clear challenge to the
dynamics of participation outlined in the reform document.
The presence of the WFO further added to existing dynamics
of contest over representation and distribution of seats in the
CFS Advisory Group. Again, directly challenging the balance
of participation of the CFS reform, the WFO, backed by the
PSM, advocated for the creation of a farmers’ mechanism
(like the existing CSM and PSM), arguing that farmers were
not adequately represented in the CFS. For civil society actors,
the inclusion of the WFO as a participant in the CSM is a
direct attempt to re-balance power in favor of the private sec-
tor. However, both the PSM and WFO backed down follow-
ing the 2017 independent evaluation of the CFS, which
dismissed the WFO’s call for participant status outside of the
Private or Civil SocietyMechanisms. Evaluators did not agree
that farmers were not well represented in the CFS ‘as there are
farmers in both [the civil society and private sector] mecha-
nisms’ (Bester et al. 2017, xix). Despite this controversy, the
WFO nevertheless secured ad hoc status in the CFS Advisory
Group, shifting the balance of power in the Advisory Group
back in favor of those who have traditionally held power.
The challenge to the most-affected principle does not only
come from private sector actors. Based on interviews with
member governments we note increased concern and resis-
tance about the role of the CSM on the Advisory Group.
4 The WFO represents a range of farmers organizations – and the WFO is
careful to have small-scale producers from the Global South speak on behalf of
the organization at the CFS Plenary (observations CFS43 (2016) – but many of
its members are made up of large-scale commercial producers.
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Reflecting the influence of civil society actors vis-à-vis states,
one state representative stated:
Basically, there’s no space for the Bureau to decide…
like the Bureau needs to say, ‘Oh, okay, everything has
been negotiated in the Advisory Group meeting, so now
we just say yes.’ That’s not true you know. The Bureau’s
decision right should be more (Interview 53).
Here the representative worries that participation of non-state
actors, particularly civil society actors, is reducing the ability
of states to take decisions in the Bureau.
Not all states representatives interviewed shared these con-
cerns, but they did recognize the changing dynamics. For ex-
ample, a state representative told us:
I hear a lot of member states arguing that the essence of
the CFS is its intergovernmental nature because they see
so many problems with this multi-stakeholder approach.
I believe there’s so much value in it, and we have to
come back to this, and really to convince also these
member states that there is a value… not only to make
it [the CFS] politically complicated but also to get some-
thing out of it (Interview 57).
Along these lines, we note a double trend that emerged
through our interviews with governments. First, many states
tend to overlook the most affected principle –which effective-
ly reinforces the political nature of participation in the CFS—,
in favor of the all-affected principle. They insist, for example,
on giving the CSM and PSM equal consideration and feel that
this equal consideration is key to the legitimacy of the CFS as
a MSP. Second, many states perceive that the CSM does not
fully participate in the diplomatic effort to find consensus and
complain that the CSM defends its positions rather than seek
compromise (Claeys and Duncan 2018b). While CSM actors
contest this view, the frustration felt by state representatives
reflects the discomfort around disagreement and the pressure
facing civil society actors – the so-called extremists – to play
along. In our view, attacks on the most affected principle are
indicative of a process of de-politicization of the CFS as these
attacks seek to limit the availability of spaces where the polit-
ical can play out.
3.2 Reducing the political in policy negotiations:
The case of agroecology
The second challenge to politicization relates to how powerful
actors seek to de-politicize the CFS by neutralizing debate
through the application of a discourse of objectivity. We illus-
trate this trend by exploring the case of agroecology.
Agroecology is a prime example of a political and contentious
issue that managed to get onto the CFS agenda because of the
participation rights of civil society.
Following the reform, agroecology was initially rejected as
a policy gap for the CFS to possibly address (Duncan 2015,
198). In 2017, after a long process and a great deal of effort on
the part of civil society, along with representatives from
France and Switzerland, agroecology was included in the
CFS’s Program of Work. As one key actor in the CSM
explained:
The CFS sometimes wants to shy away from topics that
are controversial, that could create not an easy consen-
sus, that could create a political debate on different
models and alternatives.…We spent like four meetings
only trying to say that the CFS could have a discussion
on agroecology. Not even saying what agroecology is
but only saying, ‘Can we debate about agroecology
here?’ We took four meetings extra just to say yes
(Interview 36).
While agroecology recently made it onto the FAO’s agenda
with a series of regional and international symposia, it remains
contentious for many governments insofar as agroecology, as
a science, movement and practice, seeks to make farming
more socially just and environmentally sustainable (Wezel
et al. 2009). Although these ambitions are not immediately
controversial, it is the rejection of the global corporate food
system that is often at the core of agroecological approaches
(Levidow et al. 2014; Pimbert 2015; Rosset et al. 2017) that
threatens the status quo. As Rosset et al. (2017, 1) state,
‘[w]hile somemay wish to deny this, agroecology has a strong
political element that is inseparable from its technical-
biological aspect’. It is thus not surprising that most G20
countries were inactive in the FAO symposia and actively
fought against having agroecology on the CFS agenda.
The tensions around including agroecology on the CFS
agenda can be seen in the comments of one state
representative:
We will have a workstream on agroecology. Very inter-
esting, but was it so necessary? Because there are other
fora, including FAO, which deal with agroecology. Was
it so necessary to focus on agroecology? Because it’s an
option for agriculture. It’s not really an issue linked to
food insecurity. That’s my perception. They say,
‘Agroecology is a combat against the current global
food system.’.… No. It’s not to combat the world food
system (Interview 52).
The representative does not recognize the link between food
security and agroecology, and dismisses the narrative that ag-
roecology presents a valid alternative for food production and
is therefore relevant for food security policy.
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A review of the process leading towards negotiations on
agroecology is instructive for understanding how the CFS
makes space for competing visions and how some actors try
to limit the political nature of these negotiations. The process
of defining the draft scope of the independent HLPE’s report
on agroecology, for example, uncovers a number of instances
where the de-politicization process is made visible through the
actions of and tools used by traditionally powerful actors (in
this case, notably the United States and the Private Sector).
The draft scope for the HLPE report was released online for
public online consultation in October 2017. In response to the
draft scope, the Private Sector Mechanism (PSM) submitted a
statement that encouraged ‘the HLPE as the source of scien-
tific advice for CFS to focus on the scientific definition rather
than the political movements and ideological debates’ (HLPE
2017a, 194). The reduction of debates to scientific definitions
and expertise is a key strategy of depoliticisation. This de-
politicized environment corresponds with a lack of negotia-
tion and deliberation between different lived experiences and
perspectives, as well a narrow view on (scientific) evidence.
As a result, governance outcomes tend to codify or entrench
hegemonic—predominantly neoliberal—forms of knowledge
and reinforce elite power relations (Hughes et al. 2018; Clarke
2011). The United States’ response continued in a vein similar
to that of the PSM. In their comment sent in by a representa-
tive from the Department of Agriculture, the United States
noted the importance that:
this report offer a balanced assessment that does not pre-
judge the contributions and limitations of various ap-
proaches or frame them in opposition to one another.
Agroecological approaches and other innovations can be
complementary, and the report should be focused on best
practices for improving food security and nutrition, not
pitting approaches against one another (HLPE 2017a, 163).
This statement from the United States functions to frame the
structure of the proposed report as un-balanced, serving to
delegitimize its scientific value. One representative from a
UN agency active in the CFS noted that in response to these
efforts, he was:
Disappointed, but maybe not completely surprised. It was
a very odd– At one stage it looks like it was going to be
agroecology and –What were they calling it? It was going
to be agroecology and bioengineering or something. It
was something ridiculous that was the opposite of agro-
ecology. I think CSM managed to advocate and success-
fully bring it back to agroecology (Interview 60).
This quote illustrates how important the participation of the
CSMwas to ensure that agroecology stayed on the CFS agenda
in the face of the opposition of traditionally powerful actors.
The case of agroecology is indicative of a contentious issue
being de-politicized by efforts to limit the political scope of a
scientific report that has a mandate to explore diverse forms of
knowledge. To eliminate the political, hegemonic actors such
as the PSM, but also states, reject the normative elements of
food security and the multiple (including political) dimensions
of agroecology. As the quotes above illustrate, these efforts
also involve disregarding civil society statements as ‘ideolog-
ical’. As one diplomat told us: ‘I find sometimes that the CSM
stifles debate by having too much of a predetermined ideolog-
ical view on things’ (Interview 54). This sentiment was fre-
quently repeated in interviews with other state representatives.
This is not something that has escaped CSM actors. As one
interviewee noted:
I think we’ve made gains on agroecology, partly be-
cause we have such a strong conviction underpinning
us in the food sovereignty approach, which makes it
easy. The downside of that is it makes it easy for us to
become ideological, with the value of propositions
they’re based on strong values that food sovereignty
dictates. It’s at the heart of what we do. But they can
use that to block us. They can claim that this is ideolog-
ical. We hear that a lot from governments. I think it’s a
strategic issue. How can we further our CSM objective
while moving forward on the practical things... and not
create an easy way for them to block us, by saying ‘oh,
its ideological’ (Interview 31).
In response to this, and echoing Rancière’s definition of dis-
agreement being about power and not misunderstanding, an-
other actor in the CSM stated:
Those who call us ideological are mostly those who
don’t like our positions. I don’t think is necessarily a
problem of understanding. They understand mostly
our positions but they don’t like them. For example,
we are called ideological when fighting for human
rights, women’s rights, the right to food… It is not like
we take this as a light issue where we can give up
(Interview 6).
This quote also reiterates concerns around self-discipline of
stakeholders in MSPs and the challenge of maintaining so-
called extreme views.
A discourse of objectivity or scientific rationality is often
adopted by actors to limit or resist disagreement and maintain
status quo. This has been used to reduce the scope of the
agroecology debate in the CFS, for example, and is more
widely made visible in calls for ‘evidence-based policies’
(Head 2010; Swyngedouw 2010). Yet a political policy pro-
cess is one which recognizes not only a diversity of stakehold-
er views, but also reflects a diversity of forms of knowledge.
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We have shown that within the CFS there are active efforts to
limit the diversity of perspectives and to reframe disagreement
as ideological so as to delegitimize alternatives. So far, thanks
to the strength and commitment of civil society actors in the
CFS, and the politicizing mechanisms they have put in place
within the CSM, these efforts have not been overly successful.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have interrogated a trend in the de-politicization
literature that suggests enhanced participation of stakeholders,
particularly through MSPs, restricts politics (Tsouvalis and
Waterton 2011). As scholar-activists concerned about this trend,
we have sought to explore the conditions or mechanisms that
enable the politicization of MSPs. Towards this end we have
used the CFS as case study of a governance space where these
depoliticizing tendencies are being challenged, particularly by
civil society actors. We have discussed three conditions that
have helped politicize the CFS: a common set of rules of en-
gagement outlined by the CFS reform process; representation of
a diversity of views and forms of knowledge; and, protecting the
rights of all actors to speak and be heard (Rancière 1998), par-
ticularly those most affected. We have further shown that while
these rules and mechanisms operate as enabling conditions that
support politicization, civil society actors also play a fundamen-
tal role. Indeed, the politicization of the CFS is directly linked to
the politicized nature of the Civil Society Mechanism itself. Not
only has the CSM gained the right to function as an autonomous
and self-organized space, it has also assigned leadership roles to
social movement representatives5 through a complex and so-
phisticated governance mechanism grounded in constituencies
and quotas (Claeys and Duncan 2018a; Duncan 2016).We have
outlined how the CSM has adopted its own set of political
practices wherein it makes a clear distinction between constitu-
encies from social movements representing affected groups
from other secondary, or non-affected constituencies (such as
NGOs). In so doing it maintains political roles for the former,
and assigns support roles for the latter (Claeys and Duncan
2018a) and reinforces the most affected principle.
Beyond highlighting some necessary conditions for politi-
cizing MSPs, another contribution of this paper has been to
document the opposition that comes from efforts to politicize
policy processes, particularly by traditionally powerful actors.
Although the right of everyone to speak has been widely
respected at CFS to date, it is coming under increasing attack
by hegemonic actors (notably the United States and the
Private Sector Mechanism). Given that an explicit objective
of politicization is to open up pathways for counter-
hegemonic possibilities (Moragues-Faus 2017; Mouffe
2005), this is not surprising. We could even consider it a reli-
able indication that politicization has indeed taken place at the
CFS since the reform. Yet, in the face of a politicized CFS,
there have been, and continue to be, deliberate efforts by pow-
erful actors to ‘reform the reform’ such as: challenging the
principle of the most affected, and neutralizing debate on con-
tentious issues where there is fundamental disagreement. The
political nature of the CFS could thus be the factor that leads to
its decline if, for example, powerful actors shift attention and
participation to other fora (so-called forum-shifting (Margulis
2015)). Indeed, alternative global food security governance
spaces exist that are less prone to disagreement, and where
states are held to lesser account due to limited participation
of non-state actors, or more disciplined actors. In the face of
these challenges, we argue for the importance of ensuring and
reinforcing mechanisms that deliberately politicize participa-
tion in the CFS.
Our analysis of a politicizing CFS has highlighted some of
these mechanisms. One is clearly distinguishing between dif-
ferent categories of stakeholders. The CFS reform distin-
guishes between states and CFS participants, retaining politi-
cal decision-making with states (in case there is no consensus)
while ensuring a diverse range of views inform and contribute
to policy outcomes. Another mechanism is clearly
distinguishing among different categories of non-state actors.
The reform sets clear boundaries between CFS participants
such as the CSM and the PSM, clearly un-levelling participa-
tion in favor of those most affected and traditionally excluded.
The reform further ensures the autonomy and self-
organization of civil society participants, which enables them
to internally adopt political practices.While thesemechanisms
are a step in the right direction, they are at once insufficient
and under threat, as efforts to challenge the most affected
principles indicate.
Just as the de-politicization of food governance leads to a
lock-in of neoliberal norms and values, often at the expense of
alternatives, re-building sustainable and just food systems re-
quires alternative visions that can only be made visible in
politicized policy processes. The politicization of food gover-
nance is therefore fundamental to re-building food systems as
it makes counter-hegemonic positions both visible and possi-
ble while re-invigorating policy processes throughmeaningful
participation and engagement with contentious issues. Thus,
while our analysis of the CFS has shown that the re-
politicization of a policy space is met with active resistance
and concerted efforts to maintain status quo, it is clear that to
rebuild food systems, business as usual is not an option
(IAASTD 2009).
5 We note that many participants in the CSM have rejected language around
multi-stakeholder processes, calling instead for multi-actor approaches. In
their view, multi-stakeholder governance wrongly suggests that all actors
(e.g., states, civil society organizations and private sector) have the same rights
to participation and the same stakes. They prefer the term multi-actor gover-
nance, which they claim highlights that while all actors have the right to
discuss and contribute, only states hold decision-making power (Claeys and
Duncan 2018b).
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